{"id":2287,"date":"2020-04-23T15:34:15","date_gmt":"2020-04-23T14:34:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sfresources.wpengine.com\/?p=2287"},"modified":"2022-12-26T11:09:34","modified_gmt":"2022-12-26T11:09:34","slug":"taking-a-new-approach-to-security-in-the-defense-supply-chain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/intelligence.supplyframe.com\/ja\/taking-a-new-approach-to-security-in-the-defense-supply-chain\/","title":{"rendered":"Taking a New Approach to Security in The Defense Supply Chain"},"content":{"rendered":"

Given the importance of every element in the defense supply chain, it makes sense that airtight security would be a major focus. The goal has always been a zero-tolerance approach to security issues. However, the reality is that these supply chains are simply too complex.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How is it possible to manage something that spans the globe and incorporates countless people in the process? It\u2019s clear that our current approach isn\u2019t working. The only solution is to change how we approach this key element of the supply chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Growing Concern in The Defense Supply Chain<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The defense supply chain is enormous, but even the smallest of intrusions can call its entire security into question. Take for example the story that Bloomberg broke in 2018<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A microchip, roughly the size of a single grain of rice, found its way onto motherboards. These were, in turn, placed inside servers everywhere. This chip was not part of the design. Despite this, it somehow found its way into multiple servers. These include Amazon, the US Department of Defense (DOD), CIA drone operations, and even a ship in the US Navy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The chip, small as it was, allowed the creator to open a backdoor into the network. This compromises all of the information within. Unlike your usual website hacks, this was something deliberate, intentional, and very difficult to achieve. And yet, it still happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The thread lead back to China, who produces a vast majority of the world\u2019s electronics. It was a worse case scenario, but could it have been prevented? It was revealed that the problem originated within the factories where it was made, and somehow passed through all of the supply chain without triggering any alarms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both the manufacturer and the customers denied the accuracy of the report, but the topic was already out there. It was time to rethink security in the defense supply chain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putting The Focus Where it Belongs<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The US Department of Defense started by looking at lower-tier suppliers who may have holes in their security. The problem with that approach, however, was the sheer number of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Pentagon alone has contracts with thousands of companies, who in turn have their own contracts and suppliers. In fact, major contractor Lockheed Martin has over 16,000 suppliers of their own<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The best place to start is by looking at what needs to change. This is where the Government Accountability Office (GAO) High-Risk report helps paint a better picture. In the 2019 version of the report<\/a>, two major areas appear as high-risk parts of the defense supply chain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n